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Introduction 
The subject of performance management within the third sector is both 	 a 
,/ 
comparatively new area of research and also relevant to wider national debates ove~~·------'·,
-:j 	
"\ 
the role of charities in delivering services as part of the 'big society.' The austerity 
~'-.".'~h ..'.'. 
',{,'1 
programme has affected funding of charities whilst local authorities and other 
=;j governmental bodies have sought to get more from the third sector for the money 
they provide. As such it is interesting to see how third sector organisations are 
managing performance in order to meet these challenges . 
•_-;;.1.;.-~,';:I This research project will interview third sector employers who deliver services on 
.'<\+'; 

/'
;" 

behalf of, or in partnership with, public sector organisations. The third sector 	is~ .~~' 
predominantly comprised of registered charities and voluntary groups and the sector 
has an established track record of providing contracted services using paid staff. 
The aim of this research is to investigate the performance management culture of
_.ill!!­
third sector organisations and, via interviews with key personnel, establish what 
systems are in place and how managers perceive their effectiveness. 
: 	 The findings of this research should allow voluntary organisations to share best ,­
practice as well as drawing attention to common problems of performance =~ 
management within the sector. 
' . 	
By conducting a thorough examination of academic and business journals related to,....-~~
-.-
•... 
the areas of performance management, particularly where these concern delivering 
services for the public good, in addition to third sector specific articles a theoretical 
~ 
3 ~ . 
basis for this research will be established. Performance management within the 
third sector is a relatively new and underdeveloped area of research and so there is 
inherent value in actively comparing articles relating to the public sector, and their 
experiences of these issues, with original research. Specific literature relating to key 
theories, models and empirical research will also be examined and reviewed. 
This research offers an interpretivist view of the sector and will be reliant on the 
successful interviewing of respondents and coding of their recorded experiences. 
This presents a number of challenges in ensuring concrete experiences are correctly 
categorised to differentiate nuances and safeguard against the conflation of unique 
'stories' into a broad brush approach. Additionally adjustments for selection bias, p the subjectivity of experience, and sample size limitations will be considered. 
:-j 
In order to properly focus this research and ensure findings are consistent and 
=e 
r" 
~: proportionate the organisations selected to contribute will need to satisfy a number 
-'...~ 
of criteria. This includes the presence of one, or more, service department(s) an 
r~' 
=! operational budgets of six figures and with between fifteen and seventy-five staff 
_i members actively involved in service delivery. Organisations ofthis size are unlikely ~ ..r 
to have dedicated Human Resources departments though are sufficient in size to~. ­q 
":~ 
require regular performance management issues. 
,f"-~! t::;
_"e: q The organisations interviewed must hold Service Level Agreements, the standard 
'contract' between local authorities and third sector organisations or a health 
services equivalent. This is important as this ensures that work is accountable to a 
third party and there is a requirement to provide regular accurate monitoring 
4 
information. This in turn guarantees that there are stipulated targets both in terms 
of outputs and also related to service quality. Service quality considerations include 
an organisation's policies and procedures and these are typically assessed against 
local authority policies. 
The interviews with key personnel in management roles will investigate to what 
extent comparatively small organisations have adopted public sector performance 
management practices and whether the associated problems of these, identified 
within the literature review, are applicable to the third sector, and what further 
issues, if any, occur from the use of these practices in a voluntary agency setting. 
However this research will also examine what the third sector does differently when 
managing staff performance and will offer assessments of the effectiveness of, and 
any negative connotations identified with, these approaches. 
The collection and analysis of information which identifies approaches to 
performance management within these organisations, and the gathering of officer 
insight into restrictions, limitations and problems will therefore form the basis for 
study. Findings will be based on the subjective experiences of managers and so 
verbatim quotations will be used extenSively to illustrate and illuminate points 
discussed. This will be considered alongside previously introduced academic 
literature. 
The assessment and weighting of these findings will further inform a number of 
conclusions. These conclusions will take into account the nature of managers' 
experiences, the frequency or commonality of occurrences, and comparisons or 
5 
contracts with established sources. Following these conclusions a number of 
recommendations will be presented. These recommendations will detail plans to 
enable third sector organisations to put into place performance management 
systems or techniques which best address identified issues within the constraints of 
funding body requirements, organisational capacity and finite resources. Cost 
implications of these recommendations will be provided complete with suggestions 
for successful implementation where applicable. 
This information will prove useful in assisting third sector organisations shape policy 
in order to address issues arising from performance management whilst satisfying 
existing contract requirements. With the continuing period of austerity and an 
expectation that voluntary organisations must 'do more with less' it is essential for 
the future prosperity of the sector that organisations, via the efforts of their 
employees, are able to provide the type of services which meet the terms of Service 
Level Agreements whilst remaining consistent with each organisation's articles and 
wider community standing. 
As stated earlier academic research concerning performance management in third 
sector organisations is an underdeveloped field of research. Therefore in the final 
section of this dissertation there will be suggestions for future research and studies 
which complement and expand on this work. 
6 
Performance Management in the third sector: current thinking and practice 
In order to properly inform the dissertation research questions it is essential that 
literature covering a range of topics connected to performance management in the 
third sector is reviewed. This includes, though is not limited to, methods of 
performance management, performance management systems within the third 
e 
sector, the affect of such systems at both employee and service manager level, and
-
the influence of public sector demands on the way in which third sector 
organisations deliver contracted services. Where literature is sparse and a topic 
remains of interest, such as examining manager or employee perspectives, a 
comparative view of public sector experiences will be proffered. 
This literature review will not offer a history of performance management or the 
third sector though will highlight areas of discussion relating to organisational and 
cultural changes within performance management techniques and also the way third 
sector organisations are seen to operate. 
Performance Management Systems 
What then, for the purposes of this dissertation, is meant by the term performance 
management? There is no doubt that performance management has come to mean 
a variety of things and acts as something of a 'catch all' term for addressing 
organisational and individual plans or techniques to meet targets, improve standards 
and address identified issues. 
7 
Evidently the organisations which fit the criteria stipulated in the introduction, 
namely an income in the six figure range, and double figures of employees, are 
unlikely to have the autonomy of a large voluntary organisation. This means that 
these organisations are dependent on satisfying Service Level Agreements or specific 
funding body requirements. Therefore, unlike national organisations such as 
Barnardo's (McEwen et aI., 2010), who have the autonomy to develop their own 
reporting systems, smaller voluntary agencies performance management approach 
is either prescribed by, or tailored to, an external organisation. 
This has been exacerbated by a move away from the grants given by statutory bodies 
at the start of the millennium to a more contract based approach and a larger 
reliance on public sector service level agreements. Recent studies show some 
27,000 third sector organisations generate at least three quarters of their income 
from public contracts (Clark et aI., 2009). Numerous concerns over the methodology 
of these service level agreements have been raised including resource intensive 
practices, poorly designed reporting tools, a focus on outputs as opposed to 
outcomes, and a tendency to use performance management for evidential and not 
improvement purposes (Moxham, 2010; Dacombe, 2011; Thomson, 2011). 
Many of the criticisms of this approach describe the way in which these performance 
management systems affect the relationship between third sector organisations and 
those delivering services. These include restrictive reporting regimes, which may be 
construed as detrimental to the values and goals of the organisation (Greatbanks et 
aI., 2010; Shaw & Allen, 2009) and can be seen as being in conflict with the 
individual's intrinsic motivation for working within the third sector (Cunningham, 
8 
! 

2001). This relationship change, described by Carmel and Harlock (2008) as the 
move from being one team to becoming employees and managers, is a precursor to 
sector wide conformity in the pursuit of performance and 'professionalism.' 
Expanding on Carmel & Harlock's (2008) observations it can be argued that 
performance management in the third sector is about delivering services in the 'one 
right way.' Whilst this offers benefits to funders, such as the ability to compare and 
benchmark performance between agencies, the same benefits may not be present in 
the manager and employee relationship. 
This area is perhaps the most interesting and to date least researched regarding 
performance management in the third sector. The conflicting priorities of 
employees, typically to service users, and managers, ensuring funding bodies are 
satisfied, in a comparatively low pay environment (Alatrista & Arrowsmith, 2004) 
offer significant challenges. With the aforementioned reliance on state contracts 
(Clark et aI., 2009) and small service delivery teams it is expected that managers will 
face a variety of human resource management challenges. Logically these have the 
potential for both positive and negative impacts on the performance of their 
employees (Davenport & Gardiner, 2007). 
It is important to note and critique the level of subjectivity underpinning literature 
concerning performance management. It is difficult to ascertain how many of the 
issues resulting in poor performance are a result of conflict between operational and 
strategic managing (Bell, 2008; Ghobadian et aI., 2009) or of identified systems and 
process failures (Harris, 2005), or of manager shortcomings (Worrall et al. 2010), or 
simply due to poor staff (Daley, 2008). In truth poor performance is a result of a 
9 
.......~-- variety of factors (Andrews et aI., 2006) and so this research will not attempt to 
examine the underlying reasons but will instead focus on the methods available to 
managers and any consequential issues there use engenders. 
For this reason the term performance management will primarily relate to the 
strategies employed to reduce incidences of unsatisfactory performance and bring 
....:;s 
about increased productivity and desired staff behaviours. This definition is broadly 
.~ 	 based on Taylor's terminology in the ClPD textbook (2002) and is consistent with 
other literature (Armstrong, 2006). One can expect that the majority of techniques 
used will not be unique and, whilst it is apparent third sector literature is sparse, 
there is a substantial degree of congruence between services delivered by voluntary 
agencies on behalf of statutory bodies and those services public sector organisations 
operate themselves . 
..... 
Similarities between public and third sector performance management systems 
Examining this further a number of identified issues within the third sector also 
'....-... -iI..
,'" --;I 
appear to be present within statutory bodies. These include a focus on compliance 
and processes as opposed to service improvement and overall effectiveness 
(McAdam et ai., 2011; Anderson & Klaassen, 2012) as well as competing motivations 
between staff, with a public service ethos (Georgellis et aI., 2011; Carpenter et aI., 
2012), and managers with their own 'red tape' constraints (Dormer & Gill, 2010; 
Chen, 2012) and also a tendency to work to satisfy the stakeholders who provide 
funds and critical resources ahead of the organisation's 'customers' (Ghobadian et 
aI., 2007). 
10 
In some literature the public and third sectors, and management of employees 
therein, are assumed to be vastly similar (Gomes & Knowles, 1999; Brooks, 2002; 
Plantz et aI., 1997). More recently Chen (2012) gives further information supporting 
the hypothesis that managers in the public and non-profit sectors are alike by virtue 
of a) a desire to serve the public interest, b) goal ambiguity (this being illustrated via 
conflicting targets regularly influenced by political factors), and c) the absence of 
precise performance measurement tools with which to adequately motivate 
employees. If this hypothesis is accepted it follows that both third and public sector 
managers will share and exhibit a commonality within their work. 
~ 
-~-..,. 
-,,~-,,; 
• 
"'"7"_--:1 
--~~ 
Chen qualifies this by then examining the differences, largely based on 
'bureaucratization' with the assertion that there is additional 'red tape' placed on 
managers in the public sector affecting decision making (Turaga & Bozeman, 2005) 
as well as motivation linked more to extrinsic factors such as job security, and 
pensions than third sector counterparts. These conclusions are largely formed from 
a United States perspective though provide an intuitive reflection of the United 
Kingdom. 
.iI/I =!I~,' ~-.*'''''::': 
With notable similarities and differences it may then be possible to infer that 
problems associated with performance management, and the perceptions of 
managers, in the public sector will largely mirror those of the third sector. However 
there are key differences between managers in these sectors and it is expected that 
this will manifest in both the absence of some concerns and the identification of 
alternative consequences. For this reason a review of the reported issues 
experienced within the public sector will better inform any subsequent comparisons. 
11 
- ..... 

-, ·a 
if!!' Associated problems within public sector performance management 
~ 
Primarily it is of benefit to clarify that performance management issues are prevalent 
---j..... within public sector organisations. Elling and Thompson's (2006) wide reaching 
-.....,,, 
",J 
survey finds that HR issues account for six of the top ten problems managers face. 
Within these issues performance management topics such as adequately rewarding 
'outstanding' employees as well as difficulties associated with low-performing 
employees are present. These issues are also reflected in UK based studies 
(Weindling & Dimmick, 2006). 
If we refer back to Chen's contention (2012) that job security is an overriding factor 
in the thought process of public sector managers it is worth considering how this 
then impacts on their ability to performance manage subordinates. Whereas 
conventional practice and literature suggests that a poorly performing team in the 
private sector necessitates action, such as the changing of the manager (Fidrmuc & 
Fidrmuc, 2007), this is less prevalent within the public sector where low-performers 
rarely 'shut down' and so poor performance is able to continue unabated (Jas & 
Skelcher, 2005). 
It can be argued that public sector managers, working in a comparatively secure 
environment and with subordinates receiving union support, find it easier not to 
address poor performance. This rhetoric is certainly espoused by the 'right' leaning 
press within the UK and is supported by the experiences of HR profeSSionals with 
63% believing their public sector organisation 'turns a blind eye' to poor 
performance as opposed to 39% of private sector respondents (Chiumento, 2006). 
12 
---.'~iId 

,~ 

\ 
Whilst it is not necessarily possible to resolve that this 'inaction' is due to 'not 
wanting to rock the boat' anecdotal evidence from a former NHS chief executive 
,~ indicates that alternative and comparatively 'nicer' approaches to tackling poor 
t 
--.,ill..~:;S performance are 'incredibly common' (Toft, 2010). 
l ",',,;', 
Identified performance management approaches of public sector managers 
Essentially these 'alternative approaches' are similar to those detailed by Taylor 
(2002) and other textbooks (Armstrong, 2006). These are role redesign, 
teamworking, counselling, negotiation, persuasion, and reward. In addition the use 
of discipline can be used as a performance management technique. Examining these 
iii 
issues in turn will form a clearer understanding of both the theory behind
----......~ -
- performance management techniques and the realities of practical application. 
-:,--'-~ 
-
.' 
~1 
-,",~,\.. " How then can role redesign address performance issues? In the simplest terms this 
----:I can mean substituting failing tasks for ones the employee is better at undertaking. --~.,' 
Theoretically this is to make jobs more intrinsically motivating (Herzberg, 1966) with 
the result that employees will work harder and performance will thereby improve. 
There is a potential 'moral hazard' here with a reward for failure of difficult or 
unpleasant duties being removed and potentially replaced by conversely easy or 
pleasant tasks. This altering of the job role relies on managers having the autonomy 
to amend job descriptions and the capacity within their team or department to 
address the substituted tasks. At the lower levels this is generally unfeasible and so 
a more prevalent alternative is a 'sideways' move. The ability to move employees 
13 
'sideways' is dependent on organisation being a) large enough to facilitate transfers 
';" 
of this kind and b) having enough synergy between job grades to ensure the new 
role is neither a promotion nor demotion. The idea that if a poorly performing 
employee is out of sight, the problem is out of mind, is rejected by workplace data 
(Chiumento, 2006) with employees instead looking unfavourably at the lack of 
action. However this is a frequent favourable 'solution' within the public sector 
(Toft, 2010) and is consistent with the behaviour of managers who actively seek to 
avoid confrontational situations (Daley, 2008). Therefore the act of redeploying 
failing staff can reasonably be categorised as a feature of public sector performance 
management. 
If a 'sideways' move is unavailable a public sector manager may seek to better utilise 
teamworking principles to improve performance. This may be possible, where 
T-~iJ
---" 
managers have a large degree of control over how tasks are completed and are both 
,. 
~.'~!i'.'"
-, 
able and prepared to give the team this autonomy. Assuming public sector 
employees have a public service ethos (Georgellis et aI., 2011; Carpenter et aI., 2012) 
this is an attractive proposition. However it should be noted that performance will 
only improve where employees have the requisite skills and are appreciative of this 
opportunity (Taylor, 2002). These variables combined with managers own 
shortcomings and potential lack of autonomy as part of performance reporting 
requirements (McAdam et aI., 2011) may temper any positive effects. The role of 
unions in advocating for members, and an expectation that 'work intensification' 
may be resisted (Green, 2001), could feaSibly deter managers from enriching and 
14 
-----","----------­
enlarging subordinates roles in a way that is comparable to private sector work 
environments. 
The use of counselling requires managers to interact with the employee as an 
individual person rather than an organisational resource and can be rationalised by 
the notion that a happy employee is a productive employee (Taylor, 2002). How this 
transpires in practice is slightly more difficult. For example whereas issues such as 
Occupational Health involvement are designed to address real issues, employee and 
manager perceptions may be less complimentary. It can be argued that the 
'outsourcing' of issues is a way managers choose not to engage with the difficulties 
workers face. Similarly emotional issues require a manager that is both engaged and 
sufficiently able to communicate with employees. This is compounded by 
comparatively lower levels of trust between employees and manager than is present 
in other sectors, and the UK wide concern of insufficient skill and training in the act 
of 'managing people' (CIPD, 2010). 
The way in which public sector organisations negotiate improvements with 
employees, at a macro level, relies on agreement with trade unions. This requires 
union approval and an understanding that changes benefit all (CIPD, 2010) and so 
may not be within a line manager's sphere of influence. However, at the local level 
managers are able to work within teams to negotiate changes in the way 
departments operate and this is an integral part of day-to-day managing. This can be 
relatively simple changes, such as encouraging employees to work from home to 
resolve productivity issues due to lack of space, or wide ranging reforms to ensure a 
department's future (Ghobadian et aI., 2007) and weather cutbacks (Pandey, 2010). 
15 
This is achieved via the consent of all parties and so employees, who have a stronger 
voice, are more likely to 'buy-in' to changes (Marsden, 2007). This can become 
problematic where priorities change and it then follows that performance will suffer 
where goals are unclear (Camilleri & Heijden, 2007; Caillier, 2010; Chen, 2012). In a 
bureaucratic structure despite the relative abundance of regulations there is perhaps 
less opportunity for managers to relax or omit rules for workers. This 'indulgency 
pattern' (Gouldner, 1954) leads to increased goodwill from employees but is only 
possible where managers are able to influence these systems. In the 1980's 
managerial 'indulgence' is adjudged to be a contributing factor in the decline of 
union membership (Wright, 1996L though increased bureaucracy after this period 
(Taylor & Kelly, 2006; Boyle, 2011) has largely reduced public sector managers' 
capacity to 'indulge' employees. This then suggests that public sector managers 
have less autonomy to negotiate changes and subsequently deliver any agreed 
solutions given respective union and government stakeholder interference. 
It is also possible for managers to improve performance through persuasion. This is 
considered to be a mutually beneficial method (Taylor, 2002L with a focus on 
motivating and leading employees via training and communication. Research 
indicates that these techniques can have a defined improvement with positive 
associations between training and performance management success (Haines & St-
Onge, 2012). Similarly negative perceptions of line-manager communication} and a 
failure to persuade, reduce effectiveness (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2008). Whereas 
the CIPD Learning and Talent Development report (2011) finds training budgets, and 
time devoted to training are consistent across all sectors, it also states that the 
16 
prevailing impression is that public sector training budgets will reduce. This then 
leads to a more compliance based approach with a resultant dilution of any 
performance improvements. However this synergy amongst budgets implies that 
there should be less difference, in terms of resources, between the public and third 
sectors use of training as a means to improving performance. 
The issue of using reward, or more accurately not being able to adequately reward 
outstanding performers (Weindling & Dimmock, 2006) feature regularly in line 
manager complaints (Elling & Thompson, 2006). Without wishing to discuss the 
myriad of employee reward options, it is fair to say that performance-related pay, 
profit share, and total reward packages have not achieved the desired effect within 
the public sector. Marsden and Richardson (1994) found performance related pay 
within the public sector showed no appreciable improvement in staff motivation, 
and may instead have had a demotaviting effect on employees in addition to the 
introduction of 'skewed' objectives (Boyle, 2011). With an operational pay cap of 1% ~.:I 

~ 
"''''"'~-'''~'> 
on public sector roles financial incentivisation is unlikely to be an option available to 
most managers. As such reward is more likely to take the forms of praise for good 
work. However this carries the risk of employees perceiving managers as unfair if 
they feel praise is not given equitably, or praise becoming meaningless if it is 
perceived to be given too liberally. This then points to difficulties with the 
communication of the message (Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2008) and problems 
arising when poor performance occurs and praise is no longer appropriate. As such 
another facet of public sector performance management is the limited scope 
available to improve or recognise performance via employee reward. 
17 
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Perhaps the most contentious, and certainly most avoided (Toft, 2010) method of 
improving performance is via the range of disciplinary procedures available. The 

public sector is regularly criticised for its reticence in using formal disciplinary action. 

Compared to private sector enterprises, and with figures adjusted to a per employee 

basis, there is only one third as many formal disciplinary cases per annum (ClPO, 

."~:.. 2007). There are further criticism of the public sectors' speed when doing so (CIPO,
_u~~''''''"''~
.' 2010) and the negatively contrasting ability of statutory bodies use of discipline to 
achieve permanent change (Rodgers, 2010). There remain practical advantages to a 
formal disciplinary approach including a 'paper trail' should matters go to an 
employment tribunal, the perceived notion from colleagues that action is being 
taken, and as a 'motivator' to 'uncommitted' staff (Oaley, 2008; Taylor, 2002). 
Conversely, and in broad terms, disciplinary action can also lead to reduced trust, 
lower employee motivation, and is both time and resource intensive. However, this 
does not explain why the incidence rate is only a third of public sector organisations 
(CIPO, 2007). As such an absence or reduced occurrence of formal disciplinary cases 
is an evident characteristic of public sector performance management. 
Summary 
This review of relevant literature then provides a better understanding of the 
characteristics of public sector performance management. To recap these are a) the 
ability to utilise 'sideways' moves to transfer out underperforming employees; b) low 
levels of trust between managers and employees; c) goal ambiguity and less 
autonomy in agreeing or delivering goals; d) a reticence or reluctance to invoke 
18 
formal disciplinary procedures; and e) an inability to adequately reward the best 
performing employees. 
This literature review has thus far argued that performance management systems 
within the third sector are largely designed, or tailored to, the requirements of 
funding bodies (Greatbanks et aI., 2010), of which statutory bodies constitute, in 
cash terms, the vast majority (Clark et aI., 2009). The problematic nature of this 
relationship and its affect on employees was offered as an underlying reason for 
substandard performance (Shaw & Allen., 2009; Cunningham, 2001). However this is 
aiiIII'"
", largely irrelevant given this research's focus on managerial perceptions and methods c~~ 
used in addressing poor performers. Given the scarcity of literature within this field 
(Chen, 2012) the experiences of the aforementioned funding bodies was offered 
given both the level of control the public sector has over performance management 
systems but also on account of the recorded 'public good' similarities (Carpenter et 
~,:x aI., 2012; Georgellis et aL, 2011) and ambiguous priorities of managers (Ghobadian 
-~y 
et aI., 2009; Chen, 2012). To qualify this a brief examination of the differences was 
offered though on balance the public sector remains the most suitable, or leastt 
~~~::j 
objectionable, available comparator. The techniques, and identified results thereof, 
"'~ -··if utilised within public sector performance management have been examined and ~","," 
relevant defining characteristics have been identified. 
This literature review then forms a solid foundation on which the research questions 
can build. The rationale behind the use, and knowledge, of systems, techniques and 
experiences will provide the opportunity for this research to gauge the extent 
common shared processes of performance management influence third sector 
19 
managers in their approaches and whether this manifests itself in the same or 
different issues than those present within the public sector. 
20 
Research Methods 
.---~ 
'h. ~'~, ..•J? 
, "R' 
~~, 'JIt'tID 
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._,",,"""; 
This project will concentrate on data provided via manager's own qualitative 
accounts of their experiences. A social-constructivist view, examining the 'meanings 
and experiences of different people in different situations' (Anderson, 2011t will 
underpin this study. A positivist approach of collecting facts and statistics in order to 
confirm a hypothesis is therefore at odds with the investigative nature required. 
There are no predictions to be confirmed and the lack of prior research, as shown in 
the previous chapter, means that this data will inform the first findings in this area. 
Whilst it may be expected that third sector managers will have some level of 
commonality with public sector counterparts there is no strong hypothesis as to 
what extent experiences will reflect existing analysis or in what ways, if any, 
differences will manifest. 
Without a clear hypothesis it is imperative that the research acknowledges how 
existing researcher expectation, bias, or prejudice can influence and interpret 
responses. My own experiences of working within the third sector, and the 
literature that I have reviewed, suggest that approaches to performance 
management within voluntary organisations are at best underdeveloped and at 
worst non-existent. For those organisations who have not expressly considered how 
they performance manage their staff I would imagine there will be a deference to 
the monitoring systems provided by statutory bodies and similar issues related to 
managing individuals in the public sector will be present. 
21 
Evidently there is no way in which I can approach the interviews in a completely 
'-.'.-'",~ 
unbiased and non-preferential way. However by acknowledging these 
preconceptions it is easier to temper the risk of leading respondents. For these 
reasons interviews will be semi-structured with a focus on broad topics and general 
experiences and I will encourage interviewees to tell their own stories. The 
justification for a semi-structured interview, as opposed to in-depth interviews, is 
due to a desire to keep the research focused on interviewees' own experiences, and 
the fact that performance management, as the literature review showed, 
.; :j
''''- ... 
",.,...,; encapsulates a wide range of topics of which not all are directly relevant to the 
':-'-'-iI research questions. There is also a pragmatic advantage in limiting the interviews so
""-....",,,,;11 
as to fit in with other organisations time constraints.~"-iI
.,.,,.,_.-;11 
The key themes and topics to be explored include information regarding existing 
performance management approaches and to what extent managers have the 
involvement and autonomy to introduce, review, and change these systems. The 
research will also approach the topic of which techniques are used in performance 
managing individuals and what consequences, positive and negative, these 
approaches engender. 
I will seek to interview participants face to face and record the discussions. If 
respondents are not willing or able to partake in an interview under these conditions 
a telephone conversation, or written notes, will instead be used. If using telephone 
interviews it is expected these will be shorter, and the lack of non-verbal 
communication will make it harder to draw inferences. Similarly notes will not be as 
full as an audio record, and so this may result in less accurate data. 
22 
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The subjective nature of qualitative data means that, as well as concerns over pre­
existing researcher expectations, the subjects interviewed also have their own 
preconceptions, 'world-view' and bias. This then can potentially reduce the veracity 
and accuracy of data gathered. For example it is unlikely that managers will admit to 
their own shortcomings when discussing any performance management problems, 
and it should be expected that the information provided is that which managers are 
willing to share as opposed to a 'warts and all' critique of their organisation and 
practice. Subjectivity of their approaches and the likeliness this will be couched with 
comparisons to previous incumbents, or other agencies and sectors will be of less 
importance than actually discussing the methods employed and the results of these 
systems. Similarly where managers interventions have led to positive outcomes this 
may manifest in overly favourable testimonies. However managers' perceptions are 
integral to understanding what they deem to be relevant, important and where 
processes hinder performance. The use of verbatim quotations is the most 
appropriate way in which to convey managers' thoughts and allows the reader to see 
how the source data informs subsequent findings. 
In addition to the use of quotations this research will utilise coding techniques to 
understand any commonality and links between managers' responses. This coding 
will give both a general overview, for example detailing which techniques are 
employed in performance management, and then a far more thorough examination 
to understand the intricacies of practice and perceptions of how effectively this 
works. Interviews will be conducted over the autumn period where contracts are 
less likely to be awarded or reviewed by funding bodies and so a more consistent 
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understanding of the issues, regarding services which are neither new or in a period 
. 
of (run-down', reduces the risk of distorted perceptions of the performance 
management process. 
Information about, and registered accounts of, charities is available to download 
from the website of the regulating body the Charity Commission. This, and 
information held on local authority websites detailing contract timetables and 
spending, are useful in locating appropriate respondents who satisfy the criteria of a) 
having a six figure income; b) a staff of force of between fifteen and seventy-five 
- employees; and c) being in receipt of public contracts. These criteria are important 
in ensuring the surface challenges managers face are relatively consistent and are 
consistent with sector-wide budgetary restraints and exterior pressures. 
However, this research is limited by the relatively small sample size and a wider 
range of interviews with managers within the third sector, examining smaller and 
~:;; 
--~ larger organisations would provide a more comprehensive study. Similarly data of
" 
this kind, pre-2007 and before austerity measures may have proved a useful 
comparator in the way performance management is utilised. This could then answer 
whether managers are looking to (do more with less' to a larger extent now or if this 
approach has always been prevalent within charities and other community interest 
groups. 
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Findings & Analysis of Data 
Interviews with managers within the third sector were conducted over a three week 
period in September 2012. Those interviewed ranged from service managers to 
chief officers of organisations and all fell within the broad criteria set out previously. 
The majority of interviews were completed via telephone though several were 
·~·~.'iI.. ~u, """''"i7 conducted face-to-face. A transcript of an interview is included for illustrative 
purposes at appendix A of this report. Interviews were conducted under the 
conditions of anonymity and so all names used in this chapter are pseudonyms. 
<-'0.!,,,>tl 
The information provided will be displayed using quotes and an indication as to how 
many respondents raised this issue will be given where appropriate. However it 
should be noted that respondents were encouraged to tell their own stories and so 
omission of a topic should not draw any inference regarding whether or not this is 
present in said organisation. In order to make the findings and analysis easier to 
follow this chapter will be subdivided into headings relating to areas of interest and 
findings will be considered alongside previously reviewed literature. 
links between recording output and managing employees 
It was apparent from the interviews that very few organisations linked their 
management of employees to the monitoring and performance measurement 
systems they had in place. Only four respondents voluntarily made the link between 
how they recorded output or outcomes in relation to individual staff members' 
performance. The use of aggregated data was common giving managers a general 
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overview of team performance. Of the managers interviewed it predominantly 
appears that if targets are being met at the team or organisational level there is no 
actively linked mechanism for ensuring all employees are performing in the way the 
organisation desires. As Steven the office manager of a charity for disabled people 
explains 'the baseline data doesn't really tell you about what individuals are doing 
but you can see if any projects are failing'. 
Those that were linking individual performance to the total work delivered are 
generally positive about this process. Methods for achieving this include using 
relatively high-tech computer programmes, for example those developed within a 
national body's framework, or sector specific software, as well as reviewing case 
.·iiJ..... .,",",:q 
notes, forms completed and assessing work as part of a continuous internal audit 
process. Deborah, the project manager of a local subset of an organisation helping 
struggling families, viewed this level of information as 'very effective' and more 
detailed than the monitoring systems proffered by funding bodies and tied to Service .}~ 
Level Agreements. 
~-~! 
There is therefore an apparent lack of formal links between Human Resources 
policies and the way third sector organisations measure their impact on the people 
and communities they help. This then allows poor performance to be hidden within 
high performing teams. Lisa, the Director of an organisation providing multiple 
services, stated new services may be commissioned 'without really knowing what the 
demand will be' and so set targets may not be the best barometer of what 
constitutes good performance. This is consistent with previous literature (Moxham, 
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2010; Dacombe, 2011; Thomson, 2011) which noted significant problems with the 
way in which reporting tools are designed and configured. 
Where managers did link organisational performance to managing individuals this 
was largely centred around appraisals and to a lesser extent supervision. This was 
discussed in positive terms with respondents finding appraisal helps 'review 
performance,' 'build staff up', and 'relay expectations.' No real data was collected 
concerning the frequency of these meetings though appraisals, where specified, 
were completed annually. This then implies that there is a possibility of delivery 
problems, or missed targets, not being noticed. Where this difficulty was 
acknowledged managers 'wouldn't wait' if an issue came up, though it is not clear 
how concerns would be identified outside of meetings by those respondents not 
using specialist software or resource intensive audit systems. 
In some interviews there was an acknowledgement that there was no link between 
measuring organisational output and managing individuals. This appears to be due 
to two main reasons. The first was a rejection of these tools being worthwhile as 
Matthew, the Chief Executive of an organisation working with young homeless 
people, explains; 
"/ don't have a structured approach, / mainly deal with things as / see them. / 
wouldn't want a tick box approach or a system that told me staff were 
working at 78% capacity". 
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The less bullish reason was one of time and resources with an acknowledgement 
that for some organisations, such as Sharon's relatively small charity which 
predominantly assists older people from a specific ethnic group, 'HR does get 
neglected.' As such there is certainly scope for organisations to adopt new practices 
and policies though this must be intuitively convincing, represent 'good value' and 
require only a low cost investment. 
Value Added 
A repeated complaint about performance measurement systems, and the way in 
which managers' record output, is that they fail to capture all the positive work 
completed by the agency. Laura, the practice manager for an organisation offering 
,,>._'. specialist legal assistance, describes thi{thusly; '\; 
'\~ )
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'Well we only get paid for what we've done. This means what we've 
recorded. There is a broader implication with the under-reporting of our 
work. There's lots of value added but unpaid for work. This is necessary 
because we work with vulneroble people who need support'. 
This includes 'soft' work such as preparing people to be able to receive services, 
raising additional funds for activities, long-term outcomes occurring beyond a 
funding period and where intervention does not lead to a tangible outcome. There 
is a juxtaposition in providing an accessible service that offers welfare or 
employment support to marginalised people and yet is paid only for those who fully 
complete the process. This may lead to employees self-selecting 'profitable' people 
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~t 	 as opposed to those with the most genuine or pressing needs. Commissioners must 
-=­......•.-~-,:,~ 
be mindful of 'perverse incentives'such as this when crafting contracts. 
~ 
~. 
iI' 	 Respondents are broadly split between those who work to accommodate their 
unfunded priorities in addition to their project plans and those who are only 
delivering what has been contracted. For the latter this may be as a result of either 
good commissioning practice, or a wholesale adoption of funders' priorities 
(Ghobodian, 2007). The reservations Laura has regarding this are to the potential 
detriment of funders, third sector organisations, and those requiring help. 
;p-~ii 
~~' 
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'There are wider implications because the reporting does not reflect the full 
content of our work. If they are allowed to pay for less than they should it --~.
----.,.... 
makes it look like we've a budget to cut.' 
, 
-',," 	
In this example it is clear the Laura is concerned that failures within the reporting 
system may result in an artificially high price for support, or a misunderstanding of 
the demand and need for the service delivered. In addition another respondent 
stated that there was a fear that exceeding targets might indicate too Iowa price for 
support and a reduction in funding. This is a perverse incentive that benefits no 
party. In this way it can be argued that this reliance on targets and the metaphorical 
tightrope, with negative consequences for both under and over-performance, 
walked by voluntary sector organisations is a barrier to improved and consistent 
performance (Moxham, 2010). This issue is also symptomatic of the lack of trust 
over half the managers surveyed have in their commissioners to actually discern the 
value of services and acknowledge the necessity of non-measured work undertaken. 
--.
­
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It would appear that there is an opportunity for more sophisticated monitoring 
systems to take into account service user 'journeys' and other less tangible 
outcomes. One respondent uses a 'recovery star' and this then allows the 
organisation to assess how clients progress. Whilst this is a subjective mechanism 
and is more abstract than simply counting successful benefit claims tools such as this 
can operate concurrently assuming adequate staff time and recording capabilities. 
Monitoring Systems in Place 
With an acceptance that only two managers, both of those from organisations which 
are part of a federation or larger national framework, are able to use their own 
proprietary systems (McEwen et ai, 2010) it appears that all other respondents are 
using the systems supplied by commissioners. The level of negotiation with 
commissioners regarding target setting, and including added value as listed above, 
differs vastly between managers. 
Lisa describes some contracts as 'take it or leave it', and Steven has found it 'difficult 
agreeing with the commissioners'. Lisa's complaint that 'commissioners do not have 
clear ideas of what they want' and another service manager's description of some 
contracts are 'nonsensical' explain why some ofthe managers interviewed find fault 
with current systems. Contrary to this other respondents appear to be actively 
involved in setting targets, and deciding which outcomes to record, both at the 
inception stage and during delivery. Two thirds of respondents are using case 
studies or additional comments as part of their monitoring to better explain the 
added value of, and the need and demand for, the services they deliver. 
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The interviews indicate it is fair to assume that small and medium third sector :~
,'\;J 
agencies, whilst not explicitly using the measuring tools the public sector utilise, are 
predominantly using monitoring systems designed by statutory bodies. This 
distinction is important and further analytical research of the systems employed, and 
not simply one sector's managers perceptions thereon, is required in order to clarify 
the extent of any similarities. 
0t" 
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Referring to previous literature (Carmel & HarJock, 2008) does this form of 
monitoring encourage or push providers into delivering services in one appropriate 
way? The reasons advocating a synergised or standardised approach such as 
collating outputs and benchmarking across providers appear to be less prevalent 
given the different experiences of managers. In fact across one contract four forms 
of external monitoring were listed which suggests benchmarking would need to 
occur across a spectrum of monitoring data. Respondents overwhelmingly described 
JI monitoring as a means of satisfying commissioners rather than differentiating
, ­
themselves from competitors and essentially this is viewed as a way for providers to 
f,'j{;-"-. 
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merely show that 'something' is being done. This is typified by the following critique 
from a volunteering manager when describing a monitoring system - " don't suppose 
it says much about the work we do other than we are doing itf' 
However there is certainly a consensus that in order to deliver services, and keep 
funding, these systems must be used and they appear to form the basis of how 
organisations satisfy their contractual obligations. The problems contained within 
these systems and accusations of 'bean counting' may explain the perceived 
disconnect between measuring organisational performance and assessing the 
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contributions of individuals delivering services. A more robust reporting regime, 
which takes into account the complexities of casework and time taken in order to 
achieve outputs, would potentially provide managers with better quality information 
regarding performance. This would then allow organisations to shift their focus 
away from measurement criteria and compliance towards the use of performance 
management as an improvement tool (Moxham, 2010). 
If an organisation's primary focus becomes delivering the contract and adhering to 
the contract terms there is then less incentive for managers to address performance 
issues where a contract has been fulfilled or is due to finish. The organisational 
capital involved in managing poor performers is perhaps deemed to be 
counterproductive in a climate of pilot and short-term projects. Respondents 
discussed issues relating to projects ending with Deborah explaining 'staff can lose 
interest in run down periods' and Harry, manager of an organisation providing 
cultural activities to disadvantaged young people, stating staff 'would just go as they 
(contracts) ended rather than using a more formal route.' This then suggests a 
culture of accepting poor performance, or of the organisation not confronting 
inadequate employees, and could possibly undermine subsequent managerial efforts 
to performance manage staff members. 
Comparisons with public sector managerial behaviours 
Following discussion about the monitoring systems in place respondents were asked 
how they manage employees who deliver services. All respondents assumed this to 
be a question relating to under-performance and the techniques they use to address 
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this. Problems in adequately recognising and fostering high performers were 
mentioned in three interviews though this question was explicitly put to those who 
did not volunteer this information. Accepting the problems in recording individual 
performance and management information stated above there was a general 
understanding that poor performance was an issue affecting organisations and 
managers were obliged to address this. This paper will now compare the ways in 
which third sector managers administer performance management approaches with 
that oftheir public sector counterparts as per the earlier chapter's findings. 
Job Transfers and Role Redesign 
The act of redeploying failing staff was found to be an identifiable trait of public 
sector management. The question was raised of whether smaller organisations, with 
less horizontal structures, would be able to accommodate the 'sideways' moves 
prevalent within governmental agencies (Toft, 2010). 
I did not ask this question explicitly though several respondents confirmed that 
underperforming employees had seen changes in their roles in order to address 
problems. Whilst not transferring per se Lisa stated that 'switching a cleaner's 
clients' occurred following personality clashes and another respondent stated that 
significant changes to job duties were made in order to allow one employee respite 
to deal with personal problems. Interestingly both these examples did not see any 
permanent change in job duties or workload. The 'moral hazard' of rewarding poor 
performers may be present in Lisa's employee not working with 'awkward' clients 
and so being able to choose who they help. However in the other example it 
33 
--------.--.--­
IF 
appears this flexibility in changing tasks was due to previous good performance and 
an organisational desire to support and keep a previously effective employee. 
Other respondents explained that role redesign had actually led to performance 
issues. Many organisations are attempting to retain and retrain staff where funding 
is lost and new contracts are taken on a 'needs must' basis. One respondent 
managing advice and information services described the problem of 'older staff used 
to working in a set way' and it remains clear that any organisation adopting a policy 
to avoid redundancies needs to also consider the issues associated with change 
management. 
Therefore it can reasonably be concluded that role redesign and internal transfers 
for underperforming employees are rare occurrences within the third sector. What 
is more prevalent though is the enriching or intensification of roles. This is linked to 
both organisational pressures with Julie, a staff member of a organisation providing 
support to the sector, explaining that her colleagues are 'mainly trying to do more to 
cover those that have gone' and also as a way of rewarding high performers. This 
reward can be seen by Matthew offering good performers 'the chance to project 
manage or get a new challenge' or Laura's decision to train staff to 'specialise in 
multiple areas' which gives them an increased status internally and improved career 
prospects externally. 
This is only possible because managers appear to have a large degree of autonomy 
to organise their workforce to achieve agreed organisational goals. Unlike public 
sector managers, who may encounter resistance regarding 'work intensification' 
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(Green, 2001) there appears to be an expectation from third sector managers that 
staff will react positively to these changes and be motivated to complete these 
I 
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additional tasks. This may be because employees are attracted to the intrinsic values 
of the organisation and not explicitly the role they are performing. There is certainly 
supported by both evidence based on empirical research (Cunningham, 2001) and 
the anecdotal evidence collected. Abdul, the Chief Officer of a charity helping older 
Muslims, stated that people 'work here because they believe in what we do', and 
Matthew said 'they are here because they want to do something to help people 
worse off'. 
-
These comments infer that managers expect their employees to exhibit a high level 
of motivation. However Julie, who has personal experience of a change in her role 
described this as a blunt 'like it or Jump it' imposition. As such it is feasible that 
whilst those interviewed view job enrichment as a positive and effective measure 
this feeling may not be reciprocated by employees. This could be exacerbated if 
third sectors workers are less able to articulate their concerns than equivalent 
employees within a traditionally unionised environment. Whilst the reasons are 
therefore unclear it is possible to conclude that third sector managers are less prone 
.­
~:_~.o. to utilising techniques such as transfers and redesigning roles though they are more 
disposed to enriching or enlarging their subordinates' duties. 
Negotiating Changes 
The prevailing technique employed by managers to elicit improvements in 
performance was the use of negotiation. Without exception all managers intimated 
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that it was their practice to discuss any concerns or what Abdul describes as 
'shortcomings' with the affected employee with the intention of restating 
expectations and working towards an agreed solution. As was noted in the review of 
existing research in order for this technique to work managers must have an 
appropriate level of autonomy in order to negotiate and approve changes as well as 
the authority to ensure this can then be delivered. Barriers to successful 
implementation of negotiation included changing priorities and goal ambiguity 
(Camilleri & Heijden, 2007; Caillier, 2010; Chen, 2012). 
Whilst the interviews led to the assumption that third sector managers have a large 
degree of autonomy in directing resources to meet targets, it was also found that 
within these contracts managers may need to deliver both contractual and 
organisational 'added value' goals. The potential conflict here if organisational 
priorities change in response to funding pressures may explain why change 
management was noted as a problem by one respondent. In general negotiation 
was shown to be largely around ensuring that employees are aware of their 
managers' expectations and that there are no legitimate barriers to satisfactory 
performance. 
The legitimacy, or not, of acceptable reasons appears to be based on managers 
subjective determinations as to why performance may be less than required. For 
example, and as discussed previously, personal problems were adjudged to be a 
valid reason for a temporary change of duties by one respondent and in other 
interviews it was clear the pressures of parenthood or caring were deemed 
acceptable mitigating factors. However outside of one example where a person was 
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seemingly promoted beyond their ability and several cases where training needs 
were identified it seems managers sought to discuss problems and then deliver their 
own, rather than negotiated} solutions. In essence this means putting in place 
systems and monitoring with the goal of supporting the employee. Expanding on 
this Lisa described the way in which issues are discussed with employees; 
~~ 'We would never go straight to disciplinary action. I think we're encouraging II"""".
-" 
- certainly more carrot than stick. We talk to our staff in a reasonable way, 
not necessarily being stern or disciplinarian'. 
However the idea that the options available to managers are encouragement and 
support or discipline is a false dichotomy. In this case it appeared the only 'carrot' 
on offer was that if the employee improved the 'stick' would not be used! 
This was a more extreme example though there was a clear inference from those 
interviewed that the responsibility for improving performance rested with the 
individual being managed. As such it is the employee's prerogative to personally 
change to meet stated standards lest further action be taken. This is typified by 
comments such as Steven's 'we gave her ample opportunity to improve and she 
chose not to' when discussing an unsuccessful change in employee behaviour and 
when employees do not improve 'in spite' of the managerial measures Abdul has put 
in place. 
As such negotiation within the third sector cannot reasonably be described as a two 
way process. Whether this is due to a lack of positive options to motivate under 
"._'"- "-"---""----­
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performers, manager inability to set different goals or a fear that individual 
negotiations may reduce accountability is unknown. However the outcome is that 
whilst third sector managers appear more willing to discuss performance difficulties 
than their public sector equivalents this is done in a more vacuum like environment. 
This is largely attributable to the relative security of set targets within contract 
periods and the absence of bargaining settlements with trade unions at any senior or 
national level. 
Use of Training 
Research shows that training budgets are broadly comparable between sectors 
(C(PD, 2011) and training was mentioned as a specific way of improving performance 
in around forty percent of interviews. This training was mainly in-house and utilised 
techniques such as 'work-shadowing' and 'peer' advice and support. External 
training is a less prevalent option requiring further 'strategic' synergy and in some 
cases senior management approval. The use of training has some crossover with job 
enrichment and in helping employees take on more complex and varied roles. This 
included the provision of recognised qualifications, including those from higher
..... ___~ii 
education establishments, with significant prospects of increasing participants' 
labour market value. As previously stated the provision of additional training is 
viewed positively by third sector managers though this has not been corroborated 
with their subordinates. 
Where an employee's performance is deemed to be unsatisfactory training, or the 
evidence that training has been provided, is important in establishing any further 
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action. For example there is a dear distinction between capability issues, where 
employees lack the requisite technical skills, and attitudinal barriers to effective 
performance. Encouragingly this distinction was made regularly via comments from 
lisa and Steven stating 'we might provide extra training if this was the problem' and 
that training has been provided or purchased 'where I've noticed issues' respectively. 
From this it can be inferred that there is no blanket policy to provide training in 
instances of underperformance and that third sector managers are working with 
budgetary constraints similar to public and private counterparts. 
Formal Discipline 
If we are to accept that negotiation is used primarily to restate expectations and 
training only addresses those barriers that are perceived to be legitimate why then 
do third sector organisations persist with meeting and discussing performance issues 
with employees? The simplest answer is that this is a precursor to disciplinary 
action. Over two thirds of respondents mentioned their disciplinary procedures as 
an option available when performance managing staff members. Without analytical 
data regarding numbers of cases, employees and timescales it is impossible to 
properly assess the comparative frequency of formal disciplinary action. However 
the general inference from those interviewed is that the third sector is closer to the 
private sector in this respect (ClPD, 2007). 
The use of meetings before formal disciplinary action broadly falls into two camps. 
This is those who are ensuring correct processes are followed so as appropriate 
disciplinary sanctions can then be applied, and those that are attempting to 
-. !'!"'V ~. ] -_.-.~-.------­
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introduce another 'chance' to employees so disciplinary sanctions can be avoided. It 
was clear that disciplinary action was not deemed to be an overly daunting prospect 
by the majority of interviewees who use this approach. That is not to say that it is in 
anyway the preferred solution of managers but more simply one which they are not 
hesitant to employ where improvement does not occur. 
Where managers seek to avoid disciplinary action this may involve more 'informal' 
meetings and use of probationary periods and contracts ending to dismiss poor 
performers. Criticisms of using discipline to address poor performance may be due 
to a notion that discipline is primarily for instances of gross misconduct. For example 
one service supervisor explained that employees would 'have to be a real problem' 
before disciplinary action was ever considered. Additionally Mark, the manager of a 
large service providing domestic support to disabled people and the elderly, 
completely rejected the use of disciplinary procedures in eliciting improved 
performance; 
'We wouldn't really use a formal procedure - that's a sledgehammer to crack 
a nut, but obviously we wouldn't do nothing'. 
The majority of respondents however describe the use of disciplinary procedures in a 
.. ;r 	 process driven way with one Chief Executive stating that poorly performing staff 
receive a 'warning, then a formal warning, and so on' or Matthew's more colourful 
'written warning, yellow card, red card'. This indicates a willingness to continue 
action through to dismissal if necessary. The positive aspect of this, aside from the 
removal of a low performer, appears to be in the way remaining staff view the 
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organisation and expectations of staff. In the most successful applications this is 
seen to permeate the culture of the organisation with colleagues working to 
maintain standards or, as the manager of an organisation helping+ recently released 
prisoners explained 'this means they don't stand for team-mates slacking off' 
Where respondents discussed the consequences of disciplinary action this included 
managers finding it 'very difficult to discuss things' and complaints from a HR 
manager that within small agencies 'the same few managers have to rotate and take 
the disciplinary/appeal/grievance meetings again and again.' Sharon explained that 
the 1ear of getting it wrong and being brought to tribunal' also made disciplinary 
action a less appealing option. With some respondents it was dear that Human 
Resources responsibility and functions fell disproportionately to chief officers with 
little structured support and already burgeoning workloads. However these 
pressures were not given as reasons to avoid formal action. 
Where those interviewed had access to support regarding performance 
management and disciplinary issues this was considered to be highly beneficial. 
Peer support, via similar agencies, to discuss problems was seen to be useful and 
access to a specialised HR department, either internally or via national federation 
structures, was considered to be 'definitely a support' for one advice manager and 
'immensely' helpful to Deborah. 
Summarising the third sector approach to diScipline within performance 
management it is apparent that this technique is both familiar to and employed 
within voluntary organisations. Though there are concerns from managers ensuring 
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the proper application of process and severity of this method it is fair to assume the 
sector's approach is generally more comparable to private, and not public, 
organisations (ClPD, 2007). 
Rewarding High Performers 
The limited options to properly recognise high performers (Weindling & Dimmock, 
2006) were found to be a frequent complaint of public sector managers (Elling & 
Thompson, 2006). Earlier in the chapter and in academic writing (Cunningham, 
2001) it was suggested that if employees believe in the charity's mission they will 
work hard in any role. There remains an intrinsic value within specialised client-
facing roles and this is highlighted by a comment made by an advice manager who 
said 'whisper it but the money probably isn't that big a deal compared to the job 
satisfaction.' However this in itself does not constitute the full measure of reward 
offered and there were several issues raised by managers regarding the adequate 
recognition of high performers. 
Common concerns include the lack of 'tangible' and financial' elements available to 
reward high performers and the problems of being unable to offer payor career 
progression. No person interviewed was offering any kind of performance related 
payor bonus scheme. The introduction of performance related pay was being 
considered by two respondents though both raised valid concerns about developing 
what Sharon describes as 'a fair way of doing this', Christine, the operations 
manager for a national organisation's branch operations described problems of 
equity; 
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'We have pay bands and have been looking at performance related pay 
though we're not convinced by it. In some roles it would seem a good fit but 
others are hard to measure'. 
In addition to these pragmatic problems with developing a workable system it is 
worth again noting the general lack of any visible motivational or performance 
benefits when performance related pay was introduced within the public sector 
(Marsden & Richardson, 1994; Boyle, 2011). Whilst this does not necessarily mean 
performance related pay cannot work within the third sector it can be assumed that, 
similar to public sector experiences, there are valid reasons for its relative scarcity. 
All of the respondents who discussed reward are using praise to recognise good 
performance. This includes congratulating individuals in one-to-ones, larger team 
meetings and also via nominations for local awards and in organisation and sector 
specific publications. Statements such as 'the guys like it when the big bosses give 
them and the service praise' made by a service manager were common amongst 
respondents. This meant the giving of praise was a universally accepted technique 
with no negative consequences such as jealousy or feelings and perceptions of unfair 
treatment recorded. The only downside of giving praise proffered, with exception to 
concerns that this was an inadequate way of really recognising high performance, 
concerned Mark's question of whether it was possible to single out employees who 
have 'gone above and beyond' when there are also volunteers present who are 
'doing lots for free.' Several managers mentioned that commissioners did not 
adequately praise services with a resultant drop in morale. It is not clear to what 
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extent this affects front-line staff and may be more symptomatic of general 
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managerial frustrations with funders' communication. 
As has been previously noted the opportunity to build one's CV by taking on 
additional tasks and through the provision of training was seen as an effective 
reward mechanism and also as a motivator to other staff members. The impression 
that organisations reward good performance was seen to be important and typified 
by over half the respondents indicating a desire to promote from within. The 
reasons proffered for encouraging internal promotions were given as rewarding 
good performance, ensuring new services had the right culture and values, 
encouraging others, looking after employees and cost benefits. However 
promotions only appear possible within organisations that are either winning new 
contracts, or replacing other staff members. Discussing internal prospects Deborah 
joked that staff 'would need to get me the sack or shoot me' in order to progress 
within her organisation. This is indicative ofthe respondents as a whole with several 
having experienced redundancies and natural wastage recently. Aside from these 
viability concerns it is worth noting one respondent's negative experience which 
culminated in the demotion of a poorly performing employee. The UK wide 
contention of managers not being trained to 'manage' (ClPO, 2010) remains a visible 
issue in the promotion of 'front-line' staff to supervisory positions. 
The final way in which managers discussed rewarding their employees was via 
increased flexibility within existing work patterns. This includes special concessions 
made outside of school term time, with Mathew allowing employees to leave early 
as 'I'll get that hour back three times with the extra work they do' and Christine 
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exhibiting a paternalistic desire to 'look after' employees. This is reminiscent of 
Gouldner's 'indulgency pattern' (1954) indicating a large amount of manager 
autonomy regarding the creation and enforcement of organisational rules and 
systems. This flexibility was described as a positive reason for working within the 
sector and was compared favourably to private sector organisations where 
respondents had previously worked. In general however there is an opinion that the 
range of rewards managers are able to offer is, in Sharon's words, 'not really enough' 
though it is clearly apparent that there is an aspiration to recognise and encourage 
good performance and desired discretionary behaviour. 
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Conclusions 
The findings section has shown that there is both a wide range of issues related to, 
and approaches within, performance management in the third sector. This chapter 
will now examine the findings in more detail and proffer a number of conclusions 
based on the interviews completed. This will broadly examine how voluntary 
agencies record performance management information, what these systems fail to 
capture, and why these methods are being employed. Following this analysis of a 
number of features characteristic of third sector managers' approaches will be 
presented with reference to public sector managerial behaviour where appropriate. 
Finallya brief summation ofthis study's limitations will be provided. 
Performance management systems 
The interviews conducted highlighted the disjointed way organisational data is 
aggregated and individual performance is monitored. Several interviewees indicated 
that where organisational or service targets were being met it was unlikely that 
performance management issues would be noticed and consequently addressed. 
Several reasons may explain why this was not deemed to be a significant problem by 
the vast majority of affected respondents. These include the exiguous possibility 
that there are never under performing employees in successful teams, as well as the 
more probable explanation that the managers interviewed are sufficiently senior so 
as to not be aware of all the performance management strategies utilised by their 
subordinates until these become substantial concerns. A third explanation may be a 
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lack of managerial will or capital to tackle problems though conclusions regarding 
the use of disciplinary action imply this is improbable. 
In order to link individual performance to total deliverable work a large amount of 
staff resources are required to either audit output or invest in bespoke or sector 
specific software programmes. That these systems are not widely used relates to 
both a rejection by more 'hands on' managers as well as continuing fundamental 
resource and cost constraints. Generally systems which only cumulate individual 
statistics are a problem in adequately monitoring performance and therefore 
criticisms of existing systems are frequent. However at this time it is unlikely that 
managers within the sector will commit to any high cost solutions given general 
funding pressures and insecure and changing contracting arrangements. 
Failure to record 'value added' 
The overwhelming majority of responses showed that existing performance 
management and measurement systems inadequately recorded or reflected the 
work completed by organisations. This raised a number of significant organisational 
difficulties including finding ways to accommodate tasks such as preparing clients to 
receive services as well as occasions where good work, that does not satisfy or 
correspond to a narrow band of outcomes, is uncounted. Unfortunately managers 
within the third sector are required to perform a difficult balancing act between 
providing the people they help with the best possible services and satisfying funder 
requirements. This goal ambiguity (Camilleri & Heijden, 2007; Caillier, 2010; Chen, 
2012) is apparent when both the front-line and recording responsibilities fall to the 
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same staff member and this is further compounded by the likelihood that employees 
will be more motivated towards client facing duties. This challenge is made more 
difficult by managers' own perceptions of the usefulness and proportionately of 
monitoring systems. 
As might be expected the linking of targets to funding is not deemed to be a 
satisfactory arrangement by respondents. Managers would obviously like larger 
budgets, less onerous reporting, and more autonomy over goals in every discipline. 
However the third sector tenders a further anomaly where exceeding targets brings 
with it the possibility of a reduction in funding. This is possible where the cost of an 
hour of support may reduce as efficiency savings, improved working practices or 
expanded use of voluntary working occur yet the amount of support hours the 
statutory body wishes to purchase remains static. This 'perverse' incentive is clearly 
not in the interests of voluntary organisations, funders, service users or any other 
stakeholder. Another negative connotation of this is that it enables organisations, 
including 'for-profit' enterprises to effectively 'game' service purchasers by 
exploiting these flaws. This approach, though not best for vulnerable people, is 
consistent with Ghobodian et al.'s observations of public sector organisations 
satisfying their stakeholders before their customers (2007). 
Incongruities such as this have decreased some organisations' confidence in 
commissioners and reduced their expectations of what is considered to be fair and 
equitable treatment. As such it can be concluded that current systems are not 'fit for 
purpose' and the absence of safeguards that protect over performance as well as the 
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lack of any framework to recognise 'value added' present a situation with no obvious 
winners. 
System Designers 
-
With the notable exceptions of the aforementioned bespoke audit systems third 
sector agencies have overwhelmingly adopted systems designed by statutory bodies. 
However the variation within agencies regarding the type of information and 
frequency of collection implies that there is very little evidence of external synergy 
-lilt 
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or benchmarking present. 
Whilst there are criticisms of these recording tools no organisation surveyed has 
disengaged from the monitoring process. At most organisations are supplying 
additional qualitative information to supplement perceived gaps within the reporting 
- framework. Therefore commissioners can expect information in their preferred 
format as well as that which third sector managers deem to be the most 
-
complimentary. This then begs the question of whether there is any value to 
commissioners in altering this arrangement. 
In answer to this there is a clear distinction between those organisations that are 
actively involved in agreeing, setting and reviewing targets and those that are not 
able to influence these variables. Where managers are invested within this process 
they are far more complimentary of commissioners and the monitoring 
requirements. This then offers a simple and effective way for those purchasing 
services to both engage providers and legitimatise monitoring systems. 
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A larger problem concerns 'run-down' stages of contracts, or continuing services on 
a short-term period. The interviews show that there is a significant risk that 
performance management issues will not be addressed in these periods and this has 
the potential to reduce the organisation's managerial effectiveness, employee 
perceptions offairness and equitable treatment and reputations for quality. 
Third sector managerial characteristics 
Whilst the behaviour and approach of third sector managers can be seen to mirror 
public sector managers in some ways this is not consistent over every trait. In fact in 
some regards, such as discipline, the third sector may be closer to private enterprise 
(ClPD, 2007). This is potentially an area for further research though the mixed 
results of this study imply that the third sector has its own unique composition of 
approaches and as such exhibits a hybrid of public and private sector methods. 
The findings and analysis of data chapter examined several areas from which 
conclusions relating to the extent of observed similarities and differences in 
managerial approaches can be drawn. This is achievable by comparing the 
previously identified characteristics of public sector managers with the qualitative 
data collected. 
From the interviews it is clear that third sector managers retain a large degree of 
autonomy in organising employees. This is then a potential benefit, to the third 
sector, of vague output focused monitoring systems. There is no requirement to 
provide job descriptions or detailed information about what employees are doing, 
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except maybe at the outset stage, and so managers have a significant amount of 
discretion in how they deploy staff. This is then made easier by employees who are 
r! 
r perceived to be more welcoming of change into their job roles than their often 
unionised public sector equivalents. That this is universally seen as a good way of 
motivating third sector staff indicates a stark difference in organisational cultures. 
There is however less opportunity to transfer poorly performing employees. This 
can be mainly attributed to the relativity small teams and shared offices used by 
small and medium sized voluntary agencies. This means there is no possibility of 
moving a 'problem' employee away from one department as per public sector 
managers (Toft, 2010). As such it can be concluded that it may in fact be the scope 
of options available that decide managerial approaches. Expanding on this, in the 
absence of being able to provide a 'fresh start' within the organisation, third sector 
employees and managers are required to be more creative, and accepting of creative 
solutions, when addressing performance issues. 
The use of negotiation was found to be flawed within both sectors though there 
were differences in the underlying reasons for this. The public sector exhibits lower 
levels of trust between managers and employees (ClPD, 2010), and managers have a 
lower level of control due to changing government directives and union influence. 
These are not specific issues within the third sector though it can still be argued that 
that there is limited potential for managers to negotiate changes. The lack of 
positive motivators, illustrated by one respondent believing the absence of the 'stick' 
was in itself a 'carrot', and the inability to influence commissioner set goals have 
limited the prospect of meaningful negotiation. Third sector managers do however 
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show far more willingness to discuss performance issues with their employees than 
those at statutory bodies though this difference is compensated slightly by the 
absence of any overarching union negotiations. 
As has been previously mentioned training budgets in the private and public sectors 
are broadly comparable (ClPO, 2011) and there is an expectation that austerity 
measures will continue to reduce money available for training. This picture of 
training being provided where it is necessary is applicable within the third sector 
where the majority of interventions offered are in-house and in several organisations 
senior management approval is required for all external courses. It is interesting to 
note that within voluntary agencies the opportunity for additional training is seen as 
either a reward recognising the efforts of high performers or as a precursor to more 
authoritarian measures for those whose work is deemed unsatisfactory. This means 
that those staff members where performance is not noticed, and this is clearly an 
inherent danger in the majority of performance management systems described, are 
ignored. This obviously has implications for staff members who may disengage with 
the organisation as well as the loss of any preventative performance management 
benefits. 
Respondents have categorically shown that disciplinary action is regularly considered 
and utilised within their organisations. Without empirical data it is not possible to 
gauge the difference in actual disciplinary cases undertaken though the impression 
garnered from the interviews presents a clear contrast with public sector data. It is 
worth repeating that the total number of public sector formal disciplinary cases 
equates to only one third of the total of private business actions undertaken (CIPO, 
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2007). From this it is possible to infer that third sector organisations are closer to 
private enterprises in this regard. This can again be attributed to the relative lack of 
'soft' options available to managers when addressing poor performance. 
However the impact of cultural elements within third sector organisations should not 
be underestimated. With staff members committed to the mission and purpose of 
what are predominantly charities there is an expectation by managers and 
colleagues that everyone must perform. This is more keenly felt in an environment 
of reducing incomes and where organisations are attempting to become more Ilean' 
in order to protect front line provisions. In the most extreme example one manager 
likened taking payment for ten hours work and providing only seven as 'stealing 
from the charity' and this organisational culture both positively tempers 
unsatisfactory behaviour within teams whilst also empowering managers via staff's 
implied consent and approval of appropriate corrective action. 
The research shows that recognising and rewarding high performers is considered to 
be a key issue within the sector. Interviewees had limited reward options available 
and the relatively small size of their organisations actively restricted opportunities 
for promotion and professional development in spite of managerial predisposition 
towards these methods. The use of job enrichment and additional responsibility in 
conjunction with the high levels of trust exhibited proved to be the most popular 
reward techniques. 
Again it can be argued that the relative lack of options available to managers, 
particularly around financial incentive and rewards, demarcates the approaches 
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taken. These boundaries encourage managers to utilise low cost options such as a 
liberal use of praise and increased levels of trust leading to an 'indulgency' of high 
performing staff (Gouldner, 1954). As such one can conclude that unlike statutory 
bodies which have the clear hierarchical structures that encourage and enable a 
series of promotions third sector organisations seek to reward employees via 
increased job and organisational satisfaction. That this is not seen as sufficient 
suggests that managers are underestimating both the intrinsic motivational factors 
(Herzberg, 1966) and the reasons people take comparatively lower-paid jobs within 
voluntary agencies (Alatrista & Arrowsmith, 2004). 
Limitations 
Within this research project I have been able to draw a number of conclusions based 
-
on both the literature examined and interviews conducted with managers within the 
..... 
U 
third sector. However there are several limitations to this research. The first of 
-• these is the relatively narrow geographical spread with all respondents representing 
organisations based in counties north of London and south of Leicestershire. This 
increases the possibility that interviewees have the same commissioners and so 
repeated problems may be 'skewed' by one statutory department's practices and 
are thereby not necessarily endemic throughout the sector. 
Another limitation concerns the public and third sector comparisons. As the 
conclusions have shown it is possible to argue that the decisions managers have 
taken are resultantly influenced by their own organisational size and capacity. As 
such a more effective comparator may have been a large voluntary sector 
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organisation using a hierarchical structure such as Age UK or Barnado's. Conversely 
comparisons could have also been made with specific smaller sections of statutory 
." bodies . 
A further identified limitation relates to the methods used in conducting this 
research. It was clear that the vast majority of applicants had extensive experience 
Ii.'" of their organisations and the sector and so, whereas existing research (ClPD, 2007; 
-
CIPD, 2010; ClPD, 2011) has clear timescales and corresponds to specific periods, 
managers' experiences and their interpretation will likely have covered a much 
longer duration. This is most obviously shown where conclusions drawn regarding 
attitudes towards disciplinary action compare empirical time limited evidence with 
undated managerial perceptions. 
Finally it is worth noting that respondents did not describe their practices or 
approaches by using public sector comparisons to any salient degree. This suggests 
..­
that whilst some literature implies a high level of similarity between the sectors 
(Gomes & Knowles, 1999; Brooks, 1992; Plantz et aI., 1997) this view is not shared by 
third sector managers. Therefore I contend that the difference between the sectors, 
and of respective managerial approaches, is more conspicuous than existing 
research has suggested. The third sector has unique issues, methods and identities 
which mean that, even with public sector systems, performance management is 
conducted differently and consequently produces a variety of divergent results. 
Though unqualified by empirical data the managerial perceptions recorded strongly 
imply this provides more successful outcomes than those observed within the public 
sector. 
55 
Recommendations 
A number of issues such as managers' ability to effectively provide services, motivate 
their staff and satisfy external funding criteria have already been identified. It is also 
expected that third sector organisations will face significant budgetary and resource 
constraints and so all cost implications detailed in these recommendations will 
include illustrative prices. 
Technological Solutions 
The first recommendation is for third sector organisations to explore the possibility 
of utilizing software programmes that allow managers to assess the contributions of 
individuals within services. The benefits of this approach include the provision of a 
framework which will enable managers to evaluate individual staff members' work 
and associated outcomes in real-time. Additionally this will require less managerial 
time and is not as reactionary as current approaches whereby problems are only 
addressed in supervision sessions potentially weeks after the event. Computer 
programmes which tie all interventions to one service user will also allow managers 
to understand and show commissioners the progress made by clients. Unless there 
is extensive consultation and continuous alterations made to the software it is 
impossible to guarantee all 'value added' will be recorded. However the 
introduction of a technological framework should still markedly improve the volume 
and overall recording of key performance indicators. 
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There are evidently a huge variety of software solutions available and organisations 
would be best advised to request demonstrations of any system. However within 
third sector organisations of the size interviewed it is not feasible that there would 
be sufficient officer time or indeed technical knowledge to guarantee the correct 
procurement decision will be made. With this in mind I would recommend that 
voluntary organisations considering this do one ofthe following; 
The first option is to attempt to 'piggyback' larger organisations' proprietary 
software. Essentially numerous major third sector organisations have developed 
expensive bespoke systems (McEwen et aI., 2010) which measure individual staff 
performance and provide an evidential base which subsequently generates data that 
reflects key performance priorities. The logic behind this is that it may be possible to 
purchase licenses, or a copy, of software already tailored to a specific section of the 
third sector such as homelessness or advice services. The viability of this will depend 
-
largely on the degree national organisations protect their own systems, the level of 
competition with the smaller agency, and whether a mutually agreeable price can be 
negotiated. For example the Charitylog website (Charitylog, 2012) advertises a 
product developed for information and advice services, which is used by Age UK and 
other older people organisations, for the price of £998. 
The second option is to purchase 'off the shelf' software. There are a wide range of 
products available which have been designed for the third sector and a list of twenty 
--
two of these is included as appendix B. Amongst so many different products there is 
substantial scope for differing options and pricing structures. AIMS provides a free 
'entry-level' package (LASA, 2012) though generally prices for ten users range from 
,~
...... 
~',.; 
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around £999 per year (Social Impact Tracker, 2012) to £2,850 per year (AdvicePro, 
2011). Pricing information is not readily available from a number of suppliers and 
the true cost once any installation, training and support charges are added may be 
significantly higher. 
Due to these pricing issues it may be that many third sector organisations do not 
think a software programme presents good enough value for money. Similarly some 
organisations may, as part of a contract, already be using a software programme 
which collects this information but does not provide performance management 
information, such as the Supporting People Cross system (St Andrews Centre for 
": "'Ifl' 
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Housing Research, 2012) and so may not want staff to have to repeatedly enter the 
same data. For these organisations I still believe there is some value in a system 
which records each staff members output though less sophisticated programmes or 
options will likely replicate some existing problems of accurately assessing individual 
contributions and documenting 'value added'. An addition benefit of the 
technological approach and a shared system is that peers are able to view and learn 
from colleagues work as well as offering advice where they note problems. Finally 
the higher visibility of monitoring strengthens the 'panopticon' principle as the 
.... employee's perception of their being observed increases (Bentham, 1995) . 
"'Ill'''' "'J!!I1 
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- There are of course risks concerned with technological solutions such as rapidly 
escalating costs and systems becoming obsolete where organisations' services or 
commissioners' requirements change. Respondents intimated that data entry and 
the introduction of new systems had previously proved difficult and so I would 
recommend that if pursuing this option organisations make use of these systems 
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compulsory for all relevant staff. Regrettably this then has the potential to increase 
conflict where managers are relaxing rules and 'indulging' staff members though this 
conformity is essential in order to acquire the benefits of these programmes. 
1'/'.. 
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Limitations of the software, and specifically the information they do not record or 
are unable to quantify, such as the difficulty of interventions, may give an 
unreflective view of an employee's work. Therefore this advocation of software 
systems is very much in addition to, and as part of, a package of performance 
management approaches that still includes supervision, observation and the 
assessment of legitimate barriers, and is not proposed as a 'stand-alone' 
replacement or solution. 
Added value, contracts and performance safeguards 
-
The issue of recording 'value added' and justifying this funding for unreported work 
remains a key difficulty. Whilst the introduction of technological systems can build 
the evidence base this does not fully address the concerns of managers that 
commissioners do not properly understand why the organisation does what it does 
and why certain practices are adopted. For these reasons I recommend that 
organisations seek to integrate the existing qualitative data they collect into 
standardised monitoring procedures. 
-­..'" 
This can be achieved through the introduction of 'recovery stars' or any other 
scaleable measuring system. Categories such as preparedness and confidence could 
provide a justification for the time spent assisting vulnerable people as they become 
~ 
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ready to receive services. It is likely that, with case studies and customer satisfaction 
surveys, organisations are already anecdotally recording this information and this is 
predominantly a way of formalising these interactions. Periodic reviews will enable 
managers to adjudge what progress is being made and help identify any issues or 
barriers to achieving agreed outcomes. Given public sector monitoring expectations 
this would supplement and not replace existing recording obligations. However this 
presents an opportunity for third sector organisations to develop their own 
frameworks with commissioners which quantify the effects and not just results of 
services. 
This method of recording information is already used by some organisations in the 
third sector and may be particularly useful to organisations attempting to find 
service users employment given the long 'drag' time between work and payment 
(NeVO, 2012). This presents opportunities to design organisation specific categories 
and also develop interesting and appealing ways of presenting this information. As 
was noted in the interviews one respondent uses a star, with each category 
representing a point on a one to ten scale. This information could also be presented 
graphically as a 'wagon-wheel', 'web', or line chart. More aesthetically pleasing 
forms of monitoring information could in turn potentially be used to motivate and 
inform service users of their personal progress whilst Simultaneously promoting the 
voluntary agency's work to prospective funders. 
Short-term contracts and 'run-down' periods have been shown to reduce employee 
motivation and undermine the performance management culture within 
organisations. Whilst there is little the third sector can do to influence 
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commissioners, save making the positive case for increased stability and detailing 
the additional start-up costs required for pilot and short-term projects, there are 
several measures which could be utilised in these situations to improve performance 
management processes. 
These include a proper application of performance management procedures 
regardless of the stage of the contract cycle and increased communication with 
affected employees and commissioners. In the case of the latter it is imperative 
l 
managers do not let staff members think their service has been forgotten where 
funding intentions are not forthcoming and that they understand that a lowering of 
quality in a 'run-down' period restricts the organisations and their prospects of 
securing alternative funding or employment. This carries a resource implication 
though in my opinion this is thoroughly outweighed by the benefits of maintaining 
the organisation's reputation and the re-intimation to staff that poor performance 
will not be tolerated. 
It is also recommended that organisations clarify with funding bodies if there are any 
negative consequences related to over performance. The 'perverse incentive' to 
meet targets and then stop does not assist anyone and so, just as there are 
contractual mechanisms to address under performance so should there be 
safeguards and guarantees so as those exceeding targets do not incur any penalties. 
Linking performance to 'value for money' ratings rather than hourly prices may 
require a more subjective approach from commissioners though it is hoped that the 
prospect of increasingly favourable outcomes more than offsets this imposition. 
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Techniques for performance managing third sector employees 
The third sector managers interviewed offered a number of creative solutions to 
I 
III 
performance management issues and this should be encouraged. The mixed 
methods employed appear to be generally working and as such I am advocating an 
evolutionary and not revolutionary approach. However with changing funding 
circumstances and a continual shift towards contracts as opposed to grants from 
statutory bodies it is vital organisations and their employees are best equipped to 
IlL provide good quality and strategically relevant services. 
It is recommended that the practices of job enrichment and increased individual 
accountability are adopted by voluntary organisations. The benefits of job 
enrichment as a motivational factor (Herzberg, 1966) and new challenges being a 
reward for high performers have already been discussed and remain valid. 
Additionally, widening the scope of each employee's role across the organisation 
should result in an increasingly flexible workforce. Staff who are proficient in 
multiple areas, and are used to changes in their duties, should also prove easier to 
redeploy in redundancy situations and be less resistant to other instances of change 
management. 
I contend that it is essential that any extra tasks or duties make the individual worker 
more accountable. In the first instance this may mean employees taking a larger 
amount of the administrative function connected to their own work. Whilst in some 
organisations a shared administrator between multiple services makes good fiscal 
sense and allows front-line employees to concentrate of service delivery this 
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becomes less viable as contracts are reduced or not renewed. In an environment of 
austerity a reduction of service funding implies a reduction in operations and 
paperwork. However in spite of this it remains probable that voluntary agencies will 
still endeavour to deliver services, even if unfunded, in their area of work. As such a 
workforce that is adept at both delivering and reporting enables organisations to 
remain lean even where economies of scale no longer apply. In my opinion the loss 
of efficiencies created by specialist administrative and front-line staff is 
compensated by a more flexible workforce able to react faster to changes in funding 
and exploit any new opportunities that arise. Accountability can also be given in 
allowing staff to lead and report on new strategies and initiatives. Examples of this 
would include plans to promote services amongst hard to reach or marginalised 
groups, increasing partnership working and streamlining referral pathways. 
There are evidently risks that work intensification will lead to disgruntled staff 
members and that employees, with devolved responsibility, may make decisions 
contrary to manager expectations. Addressing the former it is key that managers 
properly communicate the reasons why additional duties are being given and that 
employees 'buy-in' to these explanations. Given current financial difficulties within 
the sector it is expected that employees will be more prepared to be flexible to 
enable the organisation to remain competitive and avoid redundancies. However, 
whilst the present economic conditions do provide a driver for change, it is 
implausible that employees will effectively and permanently change their behaviour 
solely on account of these pressures. As such managers must accept that gaining 
agreement, and working with employees, are far more effective methods of 
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increasing job roles and instigating lasting change management. Devolving decision 
making responsibility may be more difficult, as highlighted by some respondents 
comments regarding the need for senior managerial approval when purchasing 
~' 
train ing. However by setting clear parameters of what is required and by supervising 
project plans at the inception stage any risks can be greatly tempered. 
I. 
Rewarding high performers 
There are inherent challenges in recognising and effectively rewarding high 
performing employees. A number of measures were already in place and, although 
several further suggestions were made, managers generally found current options to 
be insufficient. This was exacerbated by both budgetary pressures and the structural 
difficulties contained in developing a fair, equitable and commensurate reward 
system. 
Unfortunately there is no straightforward way to solve this quandary. I recommend 
that managers adopt the same creative approaches used to address unsatisfactory 
performance and utilise a variety of low-cost options. These include the use of 
praise, both informally and through local awards which also help promote services, 
and, within reason, the continued 'indulgencies' of allowing workers more flexible 
conditions. 
I would also encourage managers to discuss with staff what they want and attempt 
to tailor rewards to their suggestions where appropriate. For example one 
respondent discussed how staff members looked to bring in additional funding, 
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outside of their job roles, for trips and activities for the young people they helped 
and these events were seen to be enjoyable. Additional provision, outside of 
contracts, for service users may be a more effective motivator than monetary 
rewards which are likely to be modest and difficult to administer. At the team level I 
would recommend managers look to offer additional social activities such as 
barbecues or meals out. A low cost alternative could include simply visiting other 
organisational projects to see how service users are being helped. For some 
organisations with disparate teams it may be very difficult to organise any social 
events and so the provision of better refreshments at staff meetings or site visits 
might be a suitable alternative. 
Aside from these methods, and with deference to employee wishes, it is 
recommended that third sector organisations look to enable employees to train for 
and gain new qualifications where possible. Several organisations are already doing 
this and it appears to both be an effective way of retaining a high performer and 
motivating colleagues. If a contractual agreement is sought in return for training this 
also ties the relevant employee to the organisation for a set time afterwards lest 
they incur financial penalties related to the cost of the course. Where training fits 
,... 
~.. organisational priorities it is also hoped that this will benefit the voluntary 
organisation though this should not be the overriding concern. Evidently there 
should be some degree of synergy between qualifications and organisational aims 
though there remain mutual benefits in a host of wider managerial and business 
related courses, 
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Shared services and Human Resources knowledge 
The final recommendation is made with the intention of helping third sector 
organisations increase their knowledge and understanding of Human Resources 
policies and procedures. The findings highlighted both the uneven way human 
resources issues fell to senior managers and also the positive way that those who 
receive external support, either through peers or within a national structure, viewed 
additional input. Given existing organisational pressures it is neither feasible nor 
proportional to employ dedicated HR staff and this is contrary to earlier 
recommendations around increasing individual accountability. Instead I propose 
that organisations seek to align themselves with other businesses or people that are 
able to provide this support and technical knowledge. 
Obtaining specialist support can be achieved in a number of ways. Given the high 
probability that the organisations already delivering multiple services will already 
have some policy frameworks it is unlikely that local capacity building and 
infrastructure groups will be able to provide wide ranging HR support. Voluntary 
agencies should therefore approach local or larger companies and ask if they would 
be interested in volunteering resources, or advertising the need for volunteer 
specialists within their trained workforce. It may be more appropriate to ask 
professional to consider a Trustee role where HR has been identified as an area for 
development. 
Another method involves organisations sharing best practice with other voluntary 
agencies. Whilst some organisations might seek to take a protectionist approach this 
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is less likely to be an issue where client groups and geographical boundaries do not 
overlap. Chief Officers may also find it beneficial to utilise peer support around 
other issues affecting the sector and this provides the potential for managerial 
groups as well as new networking and partnership opportunities. In the most 
developed way organisations may consider sharing HR resources though this should 
only be really considered where formal partnership agreements, such as jOint 
contract arrangements and aligned practices, are already in place. 
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Future Research 
.. As was stated within the introduction performance management in the third sector 
is a relatively sparse area of research. Whilst this dissertation offers an insight into 
the qualitative perceptions of managers there are a number of identified limitations 
which further studies could address. The conclusions noted the merits of finding 
specific comparators within either the pUblic or private sector as opposed to the 
method employed of evaluating individual experiences against holistic 
interpretations of sectoral issues. Concerns regarding the narrow geographical 
spread of participants and the comparison of empirical evidence and qualitative data 
remain valid. 
Major areas I feel it would be beneficial to continue researching include examining a 
smaller set of organisations, or a single organisation, in more detail. There was an 
undercurrent, from those in less senior management positions, of dissatisfaction 
with some aspects of the ways in which they were personally performance managed. 
It would be interesting to find out the experiences of their subordinates in order to 
gain a fuller picture of how performance management techniques work for every 
relevant party. This could be done by conducting interviews with employees and 
also via observations of managerial interactions. 
I have recommended that voluntary organisations examine the use of technology to 
better record management information. With this in mind further investigation of 
the benefits of this approach, based on evaluating the software capabilities as well 
..... 
as manager impressions, may prove constructive in assessing the impact this can 
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have on both the areas of performance management and also wider organisation 
performance. Whilst it may not be possible to successfully link organisational 
achievements to computer programmes per se firm conclusions regarding resource 
implications, such as saved time and differences in outputs generated, can be 
quantified. 
A further area where this research can be developed is in examining the ways 
organisational performance data is used to inform the commissioning decision 
making process and in assessing how valuable the current monitoring arrangements 
are to public sector bodies. With movement towards payment by results within both 
the public and third sector a greater understanding of the identified flaws in narrow 
measurement criteria, and the potential impact the loss of 'added value' proVided by 
voluntary agencies might incur, could be assessed. 
The final area where this study can inform future research is in measuring the impact 
the use offormal HR policies and procedures have within voluntary agencies. Ofthe 
managers interviewed there was evidence of both a predominately process driven 
approach to performance management and also a far more flexible arrangement, 
rejecting formality, in the manager-employee relationship. Within the current 
context it is clear that voluntary agencies expect reductions in funding and it is fair to 
assume not every organisation will be able to continue providing services. This then 
may necessitate a higher level of formal procedures, for example in dealing with 
redundancies, and observations can be made on the way this changes the 
'indulgency' dynamic. Similarly organisations that exhibit very formal structures may 
Theserequire a more flexible and less regulated workforce in austere times. 
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juxtapositions could provide a unique insight into enforced change management of, 
and the relevant preparatory benefits of contrasting approaches to, HR processes 
within the third sector. 
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Appendix A - Sample Transcript 
Interview -lisa (Director) 19/9/12 1.30pm 
(Introduction thanking Lisa for agreeing to participate and an explanation of how 
data will be used and stored - brief explanation of the desire to hear her experiences 
and 'stories.') 
OM: What performance management or measurement systems do you use? 
l: We have a range of contracts all of which have set targets. This workload is then 
split between team members. We currently have a lot of projects but only two 
, 
managers who have to keep everything flowing. Internally we have regular 
supervision of our staff, and we report on a mainly quarterly basis. We never miss 
our targets! 
OM: Who decides the targets? 
l: We agree targets at the contract outset. As I said we have lots of schemes and the 
targets tend to be what managers think is achievable and reasonable. Once a 
contract is set up we have less legroom and on some contracts it's pretty much 'take 
it or leave it' - we then have to decide whether the contract is worth doing. 
On some contracts commissioners do not have clear ideas of what they want. Some 
are very output heavy and this may not be the same as what they want the service 
to achieve overall, others may be commissioned to meet a need without really 
knowing what the demand will be. 
80 
High outputs don't necessary mean a high quality service, and often we need to try 
and work out what is necessary to the success of the project and what is more 
objective. 
OM: How do you address performance issues? 
L: A lot of this is done through supervision, for example we have a supervisor who 
has doubled targets, and always goes the extra mile and we encourage this 
commitment to delivering good services. 
We have our own internal recording system which does a lot of counting for us, and 
provides the information funders' need. This is bespoke to the sector, but not to us. 
The software developer is very helpful and my managers can contact him. This 
system lets us know how many people each staff member is seeing, time spent at 
appointments and gives better demographic information. 
OM: How is the information entered onto this recording system? 
L: Staff load in their own information. This means that their case-notes are visible to 
colleagues and so there is an element of peer review. This system is good for 
supervision and is useful if a problem or conflict arises when reviewing. Supervisors 
can analyse this data though I'm not sure how often this would be done. 
We obviously have to trust our staff are honest and what they write is a true 
reflection of what they are actually doing. I suppose it would become apparent if 
they were not attending appointments or doing what they should be. 
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OM: Do you have experience of any performance management issues? 
L: When staff aren't performing well 1 want their supervisors to 'coach' them and 
, 	 help them achieve the required standards. We would never go straight to 
disciplinary action. I think we're encouraging - certainly more carrot than stick. Weii' 
rI 
talk to our staff in a reasonable way, not necessarily being stern or disciplinarian. 
We look to see if there are any reasons and if we can plan work differently. Our staff 
are clear that there is an expectation of quality -I think that we scrutinize work with 
service users well. 
Sometimes a service user will make a comment or complaint and we'll then 
investigate. Supervisors and managers get feedback from clients and can see if this 
is an isolated incident or a wider problem. 
On the pay front staff obviously work hard and want to advance and improve but 
this isn't always possible within a small team. 
OM: What options are available to managers? 
L: When a problem is noted we'll usually increase the monitoring and hopefully nip 
things in the bud. 
OM: What if this doesn't have the desired effect? 
'"" ·"J.~.r.;,,-,,­.. 
" 
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L: We would then take disciplinary action. Sometimes we might provide extra 
training, if this was the problem. Managers do in-house training but we'll pay for 
outside though! have to approve this. 
Sometimes we'll change a role slightly. Generally speaking there is a degree of 
flexibility in what we do and managers can make changes. This might be switching a 
cleaners clients if there is a personality clash. Having a large team means we can 
normally find staff that get on and don't mind our more awkward clients! This is 
done on quite a small scale and the job itself doesn't change - just the 
person/location. 
Where someone is just unable to do the job we have to be prepared for disciplinary 
action. However this is our last resort and we'd prefer amicable solutions and this is 
what happens in the vast majority of performance problems. 
DM: How do you think your staff view performance management? 
L: I would think that staff understand the reasons behind our decisions and that we 
can't be poor, or deliver rubbish. I think people know that we're not afraid to tackle 
issues and take action. 
I want services that always improve, and believe what we do is, at worst, fit for 
purpose. We get good value out of our workforce and, in these tough times, I think 
there is faith in management and a general optimism. My managers expect and get 
good performances without being harsh or unfair. 
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Appendix B - Third Sector Software Programmes 
Information taken from http://www.itforcharities.co.uk/clientsw.htm (Accessed 19 
October 2012); 
- - - - - -- ~ -- -------- ------- - ~~---- ---------- -------~ - -- - -----­Company Product Website Tel no. 
;Advice UK !AdvicePro 0207469 .: www.advicepro.org.uk 
5702 
----,,_.,. ,,------ "-. -.- -_.._."---,,.- ,-'----"'-----,---------- ---------------.-,,-,--~--,--,-----~-,~-
,Penelope Client 	 0203286
:Athena Software . 	 iwww.athena-software.co.uk~Management Software 9683 
iBlue Door 08700i 	 !Caseworker Connect :www.caseworkerconnect.co.uk 601 865;Software 
0845612~CCWorks iApricot, ODM 'www.ccworks.co.uk 
3577 
-._- - ... ------ - ,----"'._--_.- .'.-.--.,----- _.----- --",~ ,- -- ".--.--~ --,-_. "-,­
01989CharityLog :CharityLog 	 !www.charitylog.co.uk 
i :763691 
0161237CHL Systems CES System 	 ;www.chl-systems.co.uk 
1872 
I 	 02871iCLtnamh ICT !Sociallmpact Tracker 	 ;www.socialimpacttracker.org 
308166 
I 0121415 :FreshwindslT lCase Colleague 	 :www.casecolleague.co.uk
I , 	 6715 
-_...., ._, - -..---,~ -",., -_. -_..-
Jhe Gallery J 	 ---iv.7~~.gal·i;~yp-~~t~;-~ship.~o.uk/ ;0207096 : 
:ODM, ApricotlPartnership 	 ;case-management/ '2800· 
,,_ . --. _ •••_ ""___. ,,_ _,,___ '"_ '"_ •• ~ ". _, ._,_... _~_,_______••" _________ ,___,,_.•.____,__ •___<_, .• _, M'~ _ ,..__ ,_ • __ •• w __ ,•• _~. 
0207840 ilHomeless Link !In-Form 	 ,www.homelesslink.org.uk 
4443 
- .... - ....-- .. --,---"._- --""--! 
10121212:illZUKA Software Manager !www.iizuka.co.uk _____ i~~~O__ __ 
- -~--- -- ------~----- ----­
·-·---·--- :01364 
Hsorted icontactLiNK !www.ITsorted.org.uk '649290 i 	
...-... -.-.--.--.--- --.---.--.- -.--;.--.--------.-----.-----b20755S-1 
,Lamplight lamplight 	 :www.lamplightdb.co.uk 8793 
Database Syst_e_m._..s._._.'. . ... ..__..._...._. 	 ! _._..._.___._ .._. __ ._ .._... _____ .. __ ._.. __ .,._.__.._._.__.. 
- -- - - .- .-------.-.,-- :020 7377 • 
!LASA iAIMS jwww.lasa.org.uk/aims/ 12806 
----- --....-.--.---.-.~----.-. -_.- -.---- -- - - . I. --- -- - .-- - -.--.--- - - -- -- - .. -- - :0208525: 
iMosaic Network iGEMS 	 iwww.mosaic-network.com4571 ! 
• -.. ---- -.-----~--.---- ---..--.-- --.---.--- f------··--·---------··--·'O-141:352 1 
:PulsionlCaman Case iwww.pulsion.co.uk 12280 I 
iTech n ology Management softwar-=_J_____.._______________.____~-----.-.-i 
j .. ,,- .. "._,__" __• __,_,._,.,_,_,w-,._,,.__ ;.,~ __~~_.•~",_,.,~, ___, . '_____ ,,---_."-	 ! I___ "r______ 
: iAEGIS software for Age Iwww.redblacksoftware.co.uk/a 101904 i 
jRedBlack Software !Concern (Age UK) !egis.aspx 1622888 i 
i !organisations _._L___________________.___'-- _____ - -­
r 	 "0"'" __ •______ ,___~••.• _____... ~_,,__ • ___""'''.______ 
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.... 
Strident Software 1------­ 101473IMinder iWww.minder-software.co.ukIDevelopment :835282 
~------.--- --- -"-~---
I 0161244iSubstance :Views www.views.coop 
I I I :5418 
!---~-'--~-- -"'.-.~.'~-.'-~' '---'-~r'------ -'---'-,--,-".-. ~--'--- -- --r'·-----------·----------- ----- ".---,~,-.--.--"'-,. -_. - '-1-------··-'"-; 
I 
I 10207359 ~mwk ,spa iwww.tmwk.co.uk :7832 
i 
ivc Connect :VC Connect ;www.vcconnect.org.uk 
, . 
-----------------·5~i~f~r~e~b~-~~d 
!Vera Solutions I : www.verasolutions.org 
i !solutions 
, I 
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